EXPOSURES Enrollee dual eligibility and high-need status (based on complex chronic conditions, multiple morbidities, use of health care services, functional impairment, and frailty indicators), MA plan star rating, and cost sharing.
T o improve the performance of the Medicare program, we must understand how to care for high-need enrollees 1 who may have multiple morbidities, 2 impairment in activities of daily living, 3 and general frailty 4 that increase service demand. Care coordination can be an important strategy to address their complexities [5] [6] [7] ; however, limited mechanisms are available to provide greater coordination in traditional Medicare (TM). Medicare Advantage (MA) was designed to fill that gap. 8 More than one-third of Medicare beneficiaries are now enrolled in MA, an increase from 19% in 2007. 9 Medicare Advantage differs from TM in that private insurance plans are paid by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) on a capitated basis to cover the care of their enrollees. Because payments are fixed, this model incentivizes payers to reduce spending. Medicare Advantage plans may emphasize better primary care and care management services for high-need enrollees to prevent expensive acute services down the line.
10,11
Two potential barriers to these benefits exist: capitated payments when not properly risk adjusted may incentivize "cream skimming" and "lemon dropping" (ie, attracting healthier individuals and dropping those with higher needs). 12 Medicare
Advantage plans may also restrict physician networks and require prior authorization for care. These policies may be challenging for high-need enrollees, potentially leading to poorer experiences. Understanding the experiences of high-need beneficiaries enrolled in MA is vital if the benefits of managed care are to work for this group. Enrollees in MA often have lower hospitalization rates 13 and fewer complications 14 ; beneficial spillover effects have also been seen on the outcomes of TM enrollees. 15, 16 Studies have argued that changes initiated by the Medicare Modernization Act have reduced favorable selection bias into the program.
17-19
However, a growing body of literature suggests that concerns remain regarding MA plans for high-need enrollees. Although some disenrollment may be driven by error in plan choice, MA switch to TM occurs at higher rates after significant health events 20 and kidney failure. 21 Evidence from the nursing home industry suggests that MA enrollees have access to lower-quality nursing homes 22 and have high rates of disenrollment after admission. 23 The Government Accountability Office has expressed concern that sicker patients disenroll in a biased manner. 24 This possibility is of particular concern for patients with complex chronic conditions or multiple morbidities who stand to lose the most in disruptions to continuity of care. [25] [26] [27] [28] Disenrollment is often a sign of revealed preference, 20 perhaps even more so if disenrollment rates are differential by patient type, which might suggest that the program does not address the preferences of these enrollees with high use of medical services. Although a recent report found that MA contracts may perform well for patients with chronic conditions, 29 other work has found differences in plan-level MA outcomes may be driven primarily by the plan's enrolled patient mix. 30 First, we characterize disenrollment trends in the MA program among high-need and/or Medicare-Medicaid eligible (ie, dual-eligible) enrollees. Next, we evaluate plan characteristics associated with an enrollee's choice to disenroll, remain in the MA program, or switch plans. Several studies have attempted to explain the drivers of MA plan choice [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] in the era before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; we evaluate MA plan decision making after introduction of the law.
Methods

Data and Cohort
Our cohort consisted of all MA enrollees in a plan for at least 1 month from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2015, and who survived at least until the end of 2014. For additional analyses, we also include all TM enrollees who met the same criteria during the same time period to assess switching to MA. This study was determined to be exempt from review and informed consent by the institutional review board of Brown University. We used the Master Beneficiary Summary Files to determine MA status. We used the Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set to identify enrollees' specific MA plans. We used publicly available star ratings from CMS to categorize plan quality. Medicare Advantage plan characteristics came from publicly reported CMS Landscape Files. Dual-eligible beneficiaries meet a state's income and disease cutoffs for Medicaid coverage and federal Medicare eligibility requirements. 38 We stratified all analysis by dual eligibility because dualeligible participants are allowed to switch to TM at any time, have most of their cost sharing paid for by Medicaid, and may constitute a substantially different enrollee population. Data for identifying high-need status came from the Medicare Provider and Analysis Review file for hospitalizations, 14 the Minimum Data Set for nursing home stays, the Outcome and Assessment Information Set for home health, and the Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility-Patient Assessment Instrument for rehabilitation services.
or (3) staying in the same MA plan. We also evaluated the rates at which TM enrollees switched into the MA program during the study period. Medicare Advantage companies have been known to consolidate their contracts with one another, 39 moving all enrollees from an originating contract into another and terminating the originating contract. To account for this, we used CMS Plan Crosswalk Files for 2015 that indicate when consolidations occur. If an enrollee was in a contract in 2014 that consolidated into a new contract in 2015 and they remained enrolled, they were classified as staying because they did not select a new plan.
Classification of High-Need Enrollees
Beneficiaries were first considered high need if they had 2 or more complex chronic conditions such as heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, and depression or 6 or more chronic conditions from the list of 26 conditions provided in the Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse and had used acute or post-acute health care services (details are provided in eTable 5 in the Supplement). Because the Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse does not report full data for MA, we calculate these conditions from across data sources that do report MA diagnoses based on the Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse algorithms. If not identified through this first step, beneficiaries were also classified as high-need if they had complete dependency in activities of daily living as indicated in a post-acute care assessment or 2 or more diagnoses indicative of frailty in their inpatient claims, such as failure to thrive or malnutrition.
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Additional Explanatory Variables
We included enrollee characteristics for sex, race/ethnicity, and age. We included 2014 plan premiums and maximum out-ofpocket payments (MOOP) in our models because investigators have found these characteristics to be important drivers of plan choice. 32, 33, 37 Beyond 2014 premiums, we included a flag of enrollment in the lowest premium and MOOP or highest star rating available in the country and net change in rating, premium, and MOOP between an enrollee's 2014 plan and that plan in the following year to see how changes in plan characteristics influence decisions. 41 We include MA star ratings that range from 2.0 to 5.0 stars in 0.5-star increments and are calculated annually at the contract level by CMS across 5 domains of quality and enrollee experience. 42 We grouped contract star ratings into 2.0 to 2.5, 3.0 to 3.5, 4.0 to 4.5, and 5.0. We also included plan characteristics such as health maintenance organization or preferred provider organization and whether the plan offered drug coverage as additional controls and the overall plan hierarchical condition category risk score calculated by CMS to account for the underlying risk in each plan's enrollee population.
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed from November 1, 2017, through August 1, 2018. We presented characteristics of high-need and nonhigh-need patients by contract star rating categories. We then plotted disenrollment from MA to TM through 2015 for highneed enrollees among all enrollees at the start of 2014, stratifying by star rating and dual-eligibility status and from TM to MA as a comparison.
To examine plan choice in 2015, we used a multinomial logit regression that allowed us to analyze our categorical outcome variable without natural ordering. We stratified by dual eligibility and high-need status to see how patterns differ between groups. We excluded enrollees who (1) moved between counties during 2014 or 2015 (n = 48 163); (2) those in special needs plans (SNPs), because their decision process and characteristics may be different (n = 787 298); and (3) those in contracts that were too new to rate or did not receive star ratings (n = 1 146 615). We also excluded those who sought hospice care (n = 456 070) during the study period.
We calculated adjusted mean disenrollment, stay, and switch rates by enrollee type and star rating, controlling for observable enrollee and plan characteristics. To more easily interpret how each plan characteristic is associated with enrollment decisions, we calculated the marginal effects of each plan characteristic on the probability of each outcome, holding all other variables constant. These marginal effects can be interpreted as the percentage point changes in the probability of an enrollee deciding to disenroll, stay, or switch, based on a change in plan characteristics.
We conducted sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of our results. We fitted multinomial probit models to see if the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives held for our primary logit models (eTable 6 in the Supplement). 43 Because characteristics of Special Needs Plans (SNPs) and non-SNPs may differ, we fitted additional models to include SNPs. All analyses were conducted in Stata software (version 15; StataCorp). Two-sided P < .05 indicated significance.
Results
In Table 1 , we present demographic characteristics of the 13 901 816 enrollees in our sample (56.2% women and 44.7% men; mean [SD] age, 70.9 [9.9] years). White enrollees were more often enrolled in higher-rated contracts than nonwhite enrollees (77.1% white vs 8.3% black and 2.6% Hispanic nonhigh-need enrollees were in 5.0-star plans). Dual-eligible enrollees also tended to be enrolled in lower-rated contracts than non-dual-eligible enrollees (4.4% of non-high-need enrollees in 5.0-star plans were dual eligible compared with 17.3% of enrollees in 2.0-to 2.5-star plans). Enrollees in higherrated plans tended to have higher mean monthly premiums (>$70 a month in 5.0-star contracts compared with $25 a month in 2.0-to 2.5-star contracts).
In the Figure, we plotted the percentage of enrollees who were still in an MA contract by the end of 2015 by star rating, conditional on survival. We also plotted the unadjusted percentage of beneficiaries who began 2014 in TM and remained in TM (and not MA) by the end of 2015. We stratified by highneed status and presented separate panels for beneficiaries who who did not have dual eligibility, only had partial dual eligibility, or had full dual eligibility. Across all groups, high-need enrollees had the highest rate of MA disenrollment by the end of 2015, with 2.6% (95% CI, 2.4%-2.7%) non-dual-eligible enrollees leaving the highest-rated plans and 10.6% (95% CI, 10.0%-11.2%) non-dual-eligible enrollees leaving the lowest rated plans. Disenrollment rates tended to be higher among those enrolled in lower-quality plans. Full dual-eligible enrollees left MA at the highest rates, with 11.1% (95% CI, 10.6%-11.6%) leaving the highest-rated plans and 18.5% (95% CI, 17.8%-19.3%) leaving the lowest-rated plans. However, dual-eligible beneficiaries also left TM to enter MA at the high rates, with more than 15% of non-high-need, fully dualeligible TM enrollees switching to MA during the study period.
In Table 2 , 23.0% (95% CI, 22.3%-23.9%) of non-dualeligible, high-need enrollees in low-rated MA plans disenrolled to TM, and disenrollment was even higher at 42.8% (95% CI, 40.5%-45.1%) among comparable high-need dual-eligible enrollees. Generally, enrollees in lower-rated plans disenrolled at higher rates than enrollees in higher-rated plans. Even in 5.0-star plans, however, high-need enrollees were more likely to disenroll (4.9% [95% CI, 4.6%-5.2%] of non-dualeligible high-need enrollees compared with 1.8% [95% CI, 1.8%-1.9%] of non-dual-eligible and 2.4% [95% CI, 2.1%-2.7%] of dual-eligible non-high-need enrollees). Full model coefficients can be found in eTable 1 in the Supplement.
In Table 3 , we present the marginal effects of plan characteristics on the likelihood that enrollees would disenroll from MA to TM, stay, or switch to a different MA plan. Non-dualeligible high-need enrollees in 4.0-to 4.5-and 5.0-star rated plans had a lower probability of 29.1 (95% CI, −30.7 to −27.5) to 30.1 (95% CI, −31.7 to −28.4) percentage points of disenrolling and a higher probability of 24.9 (95% CI, 23.2-26.6) to 26.0 (95% CI, 24.1-27.9) percentage points of staying in the same plan than a non-dual-eligible high-need enrollee in a 2.0-or 2.5-star rated plan. Among high-need enrollees, a $100 premium increase in the following year was associated with a decrease in the probability of staying in the same plan by 33.9 percentage points (95% CI, −34.9 to −33.0 percentage points) and an Abbreviation: MOOP, maximum out-of-pocket payment. In sensitivity analysis, the directionality and significance of all coefficients in a multinomial probit specification remain unchanged, and marginal effects were similar. When including SNP plans in the multinomial models, no substantial changes occurred in the pattern of results. In the eTable 4 in the Supplement, we also present a comparison of enrollment decisions for those who receive hospice services before they die. Disenrollment rates were substantially higher for those who received hospice benefits (57.3%) compared with those who did not (5.1%). We also present in eFigures 1 through 3 in the Supplement plots of the probability of a high-need or a nonhigh-need enrollee entering a plan with the highest ratings or lowest premiums available in their market in 2015 and found that high-need enrollees generally entered lower-premium and lower-quality plans.
Analysis of Drivers of Medicare Advantage Disenrollment and Plan Switching
Discussion
We find that high-need and dual-eligible enrollees have substantially higher disenrollment rates when compared with non-high-need enrollees. This finding aligns with that of the recent Government Accountability Office report on disenrollment 25 and other recent examples from the literature 20,21,44 that suggest that MA plans may not currently meet the preferences of high-need enrollees. We also found large movement of TM enrollees into MA during the study period, particularly among dual-eligible beneficiaries, indicating a high level of switching in this population. Several factors may explain differential disenrollment during this study period. Although risk adjustment has mitigated some cream skimming, 18 plans may still not have an incentive to retain their high-need enrollees, leading to adverse selection not on who enrolls in plans but on those who disenroll. The limitations (eg, narrow networks, prior authorizations, etc) enacted by MA plans to control costs may not align with the preferences of enrollees who have complex care needs. Lower disenrollment rates from highrated plans may be indicative of these plans providing fewer restrictions in access to care or other benefits to such enrollees. Beneficiaries with better health and socioeconomic status may also be better equipped to make more informed plan choices when first enrolling in MA. High-need enrollees may select suboptimal contracts when they first enroll in the program, and, when faced with the limitations those contracts contain, may be prompted to switch more often than healthier enrollees. High-need enrollees may also be enrolled in lower-rated plans because their more serious health needs exert a downward pull on the overall contract rating.
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The high levels of disenrollment that we find present methodologic issues for investigators who seek to study the performance of MA in caring for high-need patients. Because patients with complex conditions disenroll at higher rates than healthier patients, the outcomes of complex patients in these plans cannot be readily assessed owing to the competing risk of disenrollment. Any effort to compare the outcomes of highneed patients between MA and TM without addressing these issues of selection are likely to be biased. The disenrollment of high-need enrollees may also substantially bias the payment and performance measurement of MA plans. If a plan receives higher risk-adjusted payments for carrying a larger burden of high-need enrollees, and these enrollees are disenrolling at higher rates, then these payments may not be well targeted. The largest changes in enrollment status from TM to MA and from MA to TM occurred among enrollees with dual eligibility with Medicaid. This finding is likely explained in part by dual-eligible enrollees being able to switch plans at any point during the year. An interplay between a state Medicaid managed care program and an MA plan may encourage more switching. The high levels of movement in this population warrant additional research.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services allows for special enrollment periods for moving between TM and MA and between MA contracts. These special enrollment periods may occur if an enrollee gains or loses Medicaid coverage, if an enrollee is admitted to an SNP and switches to an institutional contract, or if an enrollee is diagnosed with a chronic condition that can fall under an SNP or a PACE (Programs of AllInclusive Care for the Elderly) contract, all of which may help explain increased movement among high-need enrollees. 46 The special enrollment periods may also occur to allow enrollees to switch into contracts rated 5.0 stars, switch away from consistently low-rated reported contracts, and to leave contracts sanctioned by CMS, which may explain shifts to higher-from lower-quality contracts. Under the MA quality improvement program, contracts rated 4.0 stars or greater are also provided a bonus payment that contracts may pass on to enrollees in additional benefits, leading to lower switch rates from higher-performing contracts. 47 
Limitations
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, fullencounter claims data are not available for MA enrollees, which limits our ability to detect all chronic conditions for MA enrollees.
Second, plan characteristics not included in our data may influence patient decision making. For example, we have little information on the physicians included in MA plan networks and cannot determine whether a physician entering or leaving a given contract's network inspired an enrollee's choice. We also exclude from our analysis contracts without star ratings from CMS. These contracts may attract more patients with serious care needs and may account for the decisions of some enrollees to leave their original contract.
Third, we are unable to determine the specific reason an enrollee left their MA contract. Although we hypothesize it may be owing to high-need enrollees facing limited networks in their MA plans that would not apply in TM, we cannot determine whether, for example, an out-of-network physician would actually provide better care of an enrollee than an in-network physician. A higher disenrollment rate a An enrollee's enrollment in the best-rated plan available to them in 2014 was associated with a 0.5-percentage point reduction in their probability of disenrolling, associated with a 3.3-percentage point increased probability of remaining in the same contract and a 2.8-percentage point decrease in the probability of remaining in the Medicare Advantage program but changing plans. All marginal effects come from a multinomial logit model adjusted for plan and patient characteristics, and they fully interacted with high-need status. We fit 2 models, one with non-dual elibility only, and the other with dual-eligibility only.
b Denotes not significant. All other margins are statistically significant at 2-sided P < .01.
Research Original Investigation
Analysis of Drivers of Medicare Advantage Disenrollment and Plan Switching for high-need enrollees does not necessarily imply a deficiency in care, but may indicate that an enrollee's preferences are not being met.
Conclusions
We find that high-need enrollees, particularly those who are dual eligible, disenroll from MA at substantially higher rates than other enrollees. Thus, our findings suggest that caution is warranted when evaluating the performance of MA plans owing to the potential for selection bias stemming from differential disenrollment. As of now, disenrollment is only 1 of 35 to 45 measures included in the MA star ratings system. Weighting disenrollment more heavily may help incentivize plans to address these concerns further. Although MA may have the potential to provide greater care coordination to address complex patient needs, it is unclear whether high-need enrollees who stand to benefit the most from care coordination are in fact benefiting.
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